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In recent years international practices of external intervention in 
the domestic affairs of a state have profoundly changed. Since 
the end of the Cold War, both states and international 
organizations (IO) have undertaken several interventions in 
areas of crisis. From the war in Iraq in 1991 to the military 
intervention in Libya in 2011, the United States and its allies 
have intervened on a global scale. Similarly, in the 90s the UN, 
NATO and the EU entered a phase of growing commitment to 
end intra-state conflicts. NATO undertook its first ever military 
missions starting in 1995 in Bosnia. Since 1990 the number of 
UN peacekeeping operations has grown in an unprecedented 
way – moving from the 18 missions during the Cold War to the 
50 in the following 20 years. 
The change has not only affected the quantitative dimension of 
the post-bipolar way of intervention, but – most significantly – 
has also reshaped the form of international intervention. On the 
one hand, recent IO missions have marked a break with the 
idea of traditional peacekeeping: the UN, NATO and EU 
operations are not just interested in keeping the peace but are 
increasingly involved in the internal affairs of the target-state, 
rebuilding its institutions, shaping its constitutional design, 
fostering economic recovery and social inclusion. On the other 
hand, states intervene multilaterally with political – not just 
military – aims. As a result, military interventions also – such as 
those initiated by NATO – inevitably have a civilian component. 
Interference in the political affairs of the target-state, even many 
years after the end of the conflict, brings about a prolonged 
international presence. In turn, an active international presence 
in a formally independent country establishes a shared 
sovereignty, in which both international officials and local 
political leaders are in charge. The idea presented in the paper 
is that the source of the shared sovereignty is the goal of 
democratization. IOs and Western states are committed to 
fostering democratic institutions in the countries where they 
intervene and are motivated by democratic ideals. This 
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Abstract 
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democratic inclination, at the operational level, leads to contradictory decisions and procedures. 
Indeed, international officials are interested in recognizing (democratically) the independence and 
self-determination of the locals. Similarly, they refuse any practice resembling external control or 
imperial domination. But, at the same time, their inherent interest in the democratization of the 
country requires some form of control over local politics, domestic decision-making and 
constitutional design. 
In order to clarify how the paradoxes introduced by the goal of democratization are conducive to 
shared sovereignty, the paper is organized as follows. The first section describes the recent type of 
international intervention and the democratization goal it embraces. In the second and third 
sections the paper will focus on how the contradictory initiatives fostered by the democratization 
bring about shared sovereignty. 
International intervention and democratization 
Since the end of the Cold War, the forms of international intervention have profoundly changed. 
This is mainly due to two tendencies. In the first place, the international redistribution of power in 
favor of the United States and its allies, which brought about an unprecedented position of 
democracy in the international arena. In the second place, new security threats – civil conflicts, 
terrorism, failed states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – have 
increasingly required international intervention since they are essentially rooted in the domestic 
affairs of states. 
The role of democratic states and the democratic culture in the current international system have 
affected several aspects of international life and, accordingly, have changed the nature of 
international intervention. To a certain extent we can define the post-Cold War interventions – from 
the mission in Iraq in 1991 to the operation in Libya in 2011 – as cases of democratic intervention 
since they are characterized by three recurring features1. They are basically conducted by 
democracies (i.e. the US and its allies), they are justified in the light of democratic principles (i.e. 
human rights protection), and they are aimed at the democratization of the target country. 
At the same time, the security threats emerging after the bipolar/nuclear confrontation require a 
growing involvement in states’ internal jurisdiction. The center of the new security concern is state 
failure, since almost all types of threat are directly or in some way associated with a failed state2. 
Indeed, civil conflicts, the proliferation of WMD, terrorist organizations’ activities and illegal traffic of 
arms occur with more probability where central government and territorial control are weak or 
missing. 
In the face of these security threats, state-building projects have become the cornerstone of any 
external intervention. Since the only way to avoid relapse into conflict, resumption of terrorist 
activities or prosecution of undetected arms trafficking is to build a functional governance in the 
target-country, state-building has become an essential part of any international intervention3. 
The combined result of the importance gained by state-building and the role played by democratic 
regimes in the current international system has been the emergence of the democratization goal as 
the legitimate aim of external intervention. Indeed, democratization – at least from a Western 
 
                                                
1 Almost all international interventions in the post-Cold War period present the same common features: Iraq 1991, 
Somalia 1992, Haiti 1994, Bosnia 1995, Kosovo 1999, Timor East 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003, Libya 2011. 
2 F. FUKUYAMA, State-building. Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 
2004. 
3 M. IGNATIEFF, State Failure and Nation-Building, in J.L. HOLZGREFE - R.O. KEOHANE (Ed.), Humanitarian 
Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 299-321. 
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perspective – is understood to be the most functional and desirable strategy of peace-building4. 
According to this view, promoting democratic governance in a war-torn society is the best solution 
for redressing the root causes of violent conflict. First of all, according to the Democratic Peace 
Theory, democracies seem less prone to wage war on each other5. Secondly, democratic regimes 
are pluralistic, representative of the people’s will and they respect minorities, therefore they are 
less exposed to the risk of internal violent conflict6. Furthermore, thanks to its procedural and 
institutional devices, democracy is supposed to be a form of governance able to resolve social 
conflicts in a peaceful manner. In short, the building of democratic societies seems to offer a 
guarantee of sustainable peace. 
Sharing sovereignty (I): Control vs. Self-determination 
To promote democratic governance in a war-torn country, the international community (IC) needs 
to assist state-building, in some cases just by supervising the local political process of stabilization 
(as with the UN mission in Cambodia, UNTAC – United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia) while in others by taking direct control through a full international administration (as in 
Kosovo or East Timor– UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and 
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor)7. As Stephen Krasner noted, 
«better domestic governance in badly governed, failed, and occupied polities will require the 
transcendence of accepted rules, including the creation of a shared sovereignty in specific areas. 
In some cases, decent governance may require some new form of trusteeship, almost certainly 
de facto rather than de jure».8 
In other words, the promotion of democracy requires unprecedented post-conflict missions. They 
tend to build not just a negative peace – i.e. the absence of violent conflict – as traditional peace-
keeping missions did, but a positive peace – i.e. inclusive of justice, equity and democratic 
governance9. As a result, international administrations and peace-building missions take the form 
of neo-trusteeships in which international officials exercise full, or almost full, authority in the target-
state10. 
In this new international approach to promoting democracy by external intervention there lies an 
essential paradox. In fact, exercising strong international control over the domestic affairs of a state 
– in order to promote a democratic governance – violates other democratic principles, such as 
those of independence and self-determination11. These contradictions pose not just mere ethical or 
abstract dilemmas, they also affect the official international decisions in the field. Most of the time 
international mandates are vague and leave room for interpretation, so it is not clear whether or 
when international administrators have to oppose or accept local political decisions if they 
 
                                                
4 M.M. BROWN, Democratic Governance: Towards a Framework for Sustainable Peace, in «Global Governance», 9, 2, 
2003, pp. 141-146; C.T. CALL - E.M. COUSENS, Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn 
Societies, in «International Studies Perspectives», vol. 9, no. 1, 2008, pp. 1-21. 
5 B. RUSSETT, Grasping the Democratic Peace, Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 1993. 
6 J. LEININGER, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping - Conflict Resolution through State-Building and Democracy 
Promotion in Haiti, in «Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law», vol. 10, no. 1, 2006, pp. 465-530. 
7 R. CAPLAN, A New Trusteeship? International Administration of War-torn Territories, Apelphi Paper 341, 2002, pp.13-
17. 
8 S.D. KRASNER, Sharing Sovereignty. New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States, in «International Security», vol. 
29, no. 2, 2004, pp. 85-120, p. 85. 
9 C.T. CALL - E.M. COUSENS, op. cit., p. 3. 
10 R. CAPLAN, op. cit.; J.D. FEARON - D.D. LAITIN, Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States, in «International 
Security», vol. 28, no. 4, 2004, pp. 5-43. 
11 D. CHANDLER, Back to the Future? The Limits of Neo-Wilsonian Ideals of Exporting Democracy, in «Review of 
International Studies», vol. 32, no. 3, 2006, pp. 475-494. 
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contravene the democratization goal. And most of the time international administrators exceed their 
initial mandates to cover political stalemates, institutional deficiencies or a lack of skilled 
administrative personnel12. 
The dilemma between “control” and “self-determination” is a consequence of the democratic 
approach to international intervention. On the one hand, democracies reject any similarity to 
colonial campaigns and occupations. So they refuse to exercise imperial severe control over other 
peoples against their will. On the other hand, the very goal of democratization requires some form 
of external control. Thus, intrusive interference in core political questions is needed at times, 
especially in fragmented societies. In the first case, we see the United States, its European allies, 
NATO and possibly the UN playing the role of a “reluctant imperialist”13, intervening militarily to end 
a conflict but without – necessarily – being interested in territorial expansion, occupation or colonial 
appropriation. In the second case, we see the actual international administrations in the field, that 
exercise full authority against a de jure sovereign and independent state. As Richard Caplan, in a 
broad analysis of recent UN international administrations, has shown,  
«never before has a mission had to make and enforce local laws, exercise total fiscal 
management of a territory, appoint and remove public officials, create a central bank, establish 
and maintain customs services, regulate the local media, adjudicate rival property claims, run 
schools, regulate local businesses and reconstruct and operate all public utilities, among 
numerous other functions».14 
The paradox generated by the goal of democratization, in turn, results in a shared-sovereignty. 
International administrators share the authority with local political leaders. On the one hand, the 
IC’s representatives are inclined to empower the locals, to respect or encourage their self-
determination. On the other hand, in order to preserve the transition to democracy in the target-
country, international administrators retain essential power prerogatives. 
Sharing sovereignty (II): Temporary vs. prolonged international presence 
The same democratic attitude to external intervention produces another paradox which is 
conducive to shared sovereignty. The paradox has to do with the length of time of the international 
presence. External interventions, particularly if they involve huge military missions, are supposed to 
be temporary because (from a democratic perspective) they should avoid ending up in military 
occupation or in the establishment of a colonial-like trusteeship. Since the essential goal is to 
promote good governance in an independent and sovereign state, the IC is interested in giving 
back the power to local political leaders. The briefness of the external interference is in itself a 
guarantee of the democratic character of the intervention. As Larry Diamond noted, 
«All international post-conflict interventions to reconstruct a failed state on democratic foundations 
confront a fundamental contradiction. Their goal is, in large measure, democracy […]. Yet their 
means are undemocratic – in essence, some form of imperial domination […]. How can the circle 
be squared? Chesterman advises that when the United Nations and other international actors 
come “to exercise state-like functions, they must not lose sight of their limited mandate to hold 
that sovereign power in trust for the population that will ultimately claim it.” This requires a 
balancing of international trusteeship or imperial functions with a distinctly non-imperial attitude 
 
                                                
12 That is the case for instance of UNMIK in Kosovo, UNTAET in East Timor and the Office of High Representative (OHR) 
in Bosnia. See, for a comprehensive analysis S. CHESTERMAN, You, The People. The United Nations, Transitional 
Administration, and State-Building, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
13 M. IGNATIEFF, Empire Lite. Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, London, Vintage, 2003. 
14 R. CAPLAN, op. cit., p. 9. 
ISPI - Analysis 
 
5
and a clear and early specification of an acceptable timetable for the restoration of full 
sovereignty».15 
However, transition to democracy is a long-term and open-ended process. Democratic governance 
requires a functioning state, the establishment of a sophisticated institutional framework, pluralism 
both in politics and society, and the development of a dynamic civil society. No one of these goals 
can be achieved in a short-term perspective. The more the target-state society is divided – e.g. in 
countries afflicted by protracted violent conflicts – the more building democracy is a demanding and 
long-lasting process. 
Therefore, regarding the time dimension, the goal of democratization entails inconsistent 
incentives. While a democratic attitude to external intervention implies temporary involvement of 
the IC’s representatives in the internal affairs of an independent state, in recent years international 
state-building missions have been long-lasting. Compared to the temporary nature of international 
interventions before the end of the Cold War, current international operations seem to be much 
more longer16. 
This inconsistency has practical effects on international officials’ activities in the field. On the one 
hand, they tend to empower the local representatives, announcing deadlines for international 
withdrawal and, more generally, they are inclined to plan temporary mandates. On the other hand, 
the goal of democratization binds them to protracted international interference in the domestic 
affairs of the states. Indeed, international mandates are constantly renewed. 
For instance, the NATO mission in Bosnia in 1996 (after the Dayton Agreement) had an initial 
mandate of 6 months, which was constantly renewed until 2004 when the European Union EUFOR 
mission replaced it17. Similarly, the UN mission in Kosovo in 1999 (after the NATO air campaign) 
had an initial mandate of one year but is still present in the country in 2012, despite the 
expectations that the UN and NATO missions (UNMIK and KFOR – NATO Kosovo Force) could 
have come to an end after independence 18. UNTAET and the subsequent United Nations missions 
in East Timor present a similar story19. The intervention in Afghanistan has followed a comparable 
evolution. In 2002, when the US-led mission Enduring Freedom defeated the Taliban and entered 
Kabul, the international task seemed to have been accomplished, but the military challenge of the 
Taliban insurgency and the civilian aim of democratizing the country required a more prolonged 
international engagement20. More recently, it is worth noting that the IC is still sending contradictory 
messages to Afghanistan, and the NATO plan of withdrawal – based mainly on domestic pressure 
from NATO countries rather than on a genuine analysis of what is going on in the country21 – 
clashes with the promises of a persisting international commitment. 
 
                                                
15 L. DIAMOND, Building Democracy After Conflict. Lessons from Iraq, in «Journal of Democracy», vol. 16, no. 1, 2005, 
pp. 9-23, p. 16; see also S. CHESTERMAN, op. cit. 
16 A. CARATI, L’intervento militare democratico, Milano, Franco Angeli 2010; J.H. LEURDIJK, Intervention in International 
Politics, Leeuwarden, Eisma Publishers, 1986; R.J. VINCENT, Nonintervention and International Order, Princeton NJ, 
Princeton University Press, 1974. 
17 Dayton Peace Agreement. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380; D. CHANDLER, Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton, London, 
Pluto Press, 2000; ICG, Ensuring Bosnia’s Future: A New International Engagement Strategy, International Crisis Group 
– Europe Report No. 180, 2007.  
18 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). See also the official mission website: 
http://www.unmikonline.org/pages/default.aspx. 
19 UN Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999). See also the official mission website: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/etimor.htm. 
20 ICG, Afghanistan: The Need for International Resolve, International Crisis Group – Asia Report No. 145, 2008. 
21 AA.VV., L’Afghanistan e il progressivo ritiro delle forze internazionali, ISPI Study, July 2011. 
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As a consequence, the political processes in the target-country – 
from decision-making to institutional reforms – are carried out in 
part by international administrators and in part by local 
representatives. While the temporary nature of the international 
engagement urges the immediate concession of authority to the 
locals, the very goal of democratization pushes in the opposite 
direction – i.e. to keep international control over the political 
stabilization. In this case also, the result is power-sharing, 
something in-between independence and international trusteeship 
where locals and internationals share ‘domestic’ sovereignty of the 
country22. 
Conclusion 
Summing up, this paper suggests the idea that shared sovereignty 
and new forms of trusteeship are basically the result of 
democratization paradoxes. According to this view, the goal of 
democratization and the democratic attitude of recent international 
interventions entail some contradictory principles: respect of self-
determination vs. external control, independence vs. neo-
trusteeship, temporary engagement vs. protracted international 
interference, and restoration of full sovereignty vs. international 
pervasive influence. 
These contradictions have effects on the international 
administrators’ activities in the target-country. While they tend to 
concede powers to local political leaders in the light of the self-
determination principle, they hold some essential power in order to 
foster the transition to democracy. While they are inclined to leave 
the country as soon as they can to give back full independence, 
their prolonged presence is required to guarantee the process of 
democratization. The result is a balance between international and 
local prerogatives which ends up in a “gradation of sovereignty” – 
as Robert Keohane named it23. 
 
 
                                                
22 R. KEOHANE, Political Authority After Intervention: Gradations in Sovereignty, in J.L. HOLZGREFE - R.O. KEOHANE 
(Ed.), op. cit., pp. 275-298. 
23 Ibidem, p. 286-292. 
